American public opinion about foreign policy is neither volatile nor capricious. Contrary to much conventional wisdom, collective opinion has tended to be rather stable. When it has changed, it has done so by responding in rational ways to international and domestic events that have been reported and interpreted by the mass media and by policymakers and other elites. The public has not always successfully judged the best interests of the United States or that of people elsewhere, nor have elites and the media always reported truthfully and interpreted correctly. Nevertheless, we maintain that Americans, as a collective body, have done well with whatever information has been provided, and that they have formed and changed their policy preferences in a reasonable manner. This conclusion is based upon analysis, both quantitative and historical, of a comprehensive set of data on foreign policy opinion changes in the United States from the 1930s to the 1980s.
1. Several prepublication readers have lamented our failure to deal here with individual-or group-level data. But our concern is with collective national opinion. As we will see, much individual-level instability cancels out across the population. And the role of demographic subgroups is of only limited interest since their opinions (even those of people with different levels of formal education, whose distinctive foreign policy views have attracted much scholarly attention) tend to move in parallel with each other (Shapiro and . assembled and analyzed. We will then describe some of the historically important patterns of opinion change during the past 50 years. We will see that foreign policy preferences have in fact had considerable stability and, when they have changed, have done so in ways that can be judged as reasonable, given the unfolding of events and changes in objective conditions as reported and interpreted by the media and political leaders. Americans have generally responded rationally to changing circumstances. That is, they have responded in ways they perceive to be in their own interest or in the interest of the nation, based upon common sense, shared values, and common standards ofjudgment obtained from the media, policymakers, and other elites. (See Cantril, 1947: 213. For an analysis quite similar to ours, though based upon less systematic evidence, see Davies, 1952 .)
DATA AND METHODOLOGY
Generalizations about stability and change in public opinion have been hampered in the past by reliance upon fragmentary or unsatisfactory data and by failure to distinguish policy preferences from other kinds of attitudes. For example, many observers have drawn inferences about the instability of public opinion from fluctuations in presidential popularity, or in prenomination candidates' poll standings, or, as with Almond, in what the public sees as the "most important problem" at the moment. The objects of these attitudes are not policy alternatives; they are political figures, whose words and deeds can change markedly and rapidly, or political "problems," which can quickly rise and fall in objective importance or in media salience. When the public's choices among policy alternatives are examined, opinion changes are much less frequent. Alleged fluctuations often amount to nothing more than artifacts of random sampling error, different question wordings, or variations in response categories or interviewing procedures. In the second part of the article we supplement these data with evidence from an additional several thousand questions fielded through 1985 by NORC; Gallup; Harris; SRC/ CPS; OPOR; the Roper Organization; New York Times! CBS News; NBC News; ABC News/ Washington Post; Los Angeles Times; TRENDEX, Inc. (for General Electric); Yankelovich, Skelly, and White; Penn + Schoen Associates; Cambridge Reports, Inc.; and the Opinion Research Corporation. With these even more comprehensive data, we examine trends in public opinion over the last 50 years of foreign policy, chronologically and by substantive topic.
The comparison of responses to differently worded questions is hazardous; even asking about joining a league of nations versus the
The 6,000-plus survey items used in the aggregate analysis include 1,128 questions that were asked with identical wording by the same survey organization at two or more time points. To our knowledge, these repeated items constitute the most extensive set of survey trends ever assembled. They address all types of policy activity by all levels and branches of government covering a wide variety of foreign and domestic policy issues. A total of 425 of them (38%o) deal with foreign affairs or national defense: military actions, spending and force levels, weapons systems, foreign aid, trade, investment, diplomatic initiatives, treaties, and other matters touching virtually all areas of the world. These 2. The archive includes many breakdowns of opinion by population subgroups as well, but these play little part in the present analysis. The data are described further in Page and Shapiro (1982 , 1987 . provide a substantial base for analyzing collective opinion changes concerning foreign policy.
AGGREGATE FINDINGS: OPINION STABILITY
The first question of interest is how much change and how much stability is found in Americans' opinions about foreign policy and national defense. The striking finding is one of general stability.
We used the modest standard of a 6 percentage point shift in responses (excluding "don't know" or "no opinion" replies)3 to constitute a significant change. (In our surveys a 6% change is statistically significant at a little better than the .05 confidence level; see Shapiro and Page, 1982: 26, footnote 4.) Table 1 shows that even by this rather generous measure, fully half of our repeated foreign policy items-215 of the 425, or 51%-showed no significant change at all. There was a somewhat higher proportion of stability for domestic issues, 63%, which suggests that foreign policy changes are a bit more frequent, but only a bit.4 3. "Don't know" responses are excluded in order to track the balance of opinion among those people with opinions-the portion of the public to which government policy might respond. Changes in proportions of "don't knows" only occasionally play an important part in altering the balance of opinion.
4. This 63% finding differs from our earlier report of a nearly identical proportion (50%) of significant changes for both foreign and domestic issues (Page and Shapiro, 1982) . The apparent discrepancy results from the fact that foreign policy opinions tend to change more quickly than domestic, when they change at all; our initial data set was enlarged here by adding Harris and OPOR surveys that repeated questions at shorter intervals than other surveys and thus picked up additional cases of rapid foreign policy changes. Not only was there general stability, but most of the 556 changes in foreign and domestic preferences that did occur (in response to the 473 questions that showed one or more opinion changes) were relatively small. Nearly half of them-242, or 44%-were less than 10 percentage points. Most of those involved preference changes of 6 to 8%-hardly startling. Contrary to what one might expect, foreign and defense items did not differ much overall from domestic issues in the magnitudes of changes, as can be seen in Table 2 . There were, however, some variations among different types of foreign and domestic issues, as shown in the first column of Table 3 .
The second column of Table 3 contains evidence about rates of opinion change. Clearly, foreign and domestic opinion changes differ in this respect: The former tend to occur much more rapidly than the latter. We defined "abrupt" changes as those that occurred at a rate of 10 percentage points or more per year. This is a somewhat lenient cut-off point; it includes any significant changes (6% or more) that occurred within approximately seven months along with bigger shifts that occurred more slowly.
Taking foreign and domestic issues together, we found quite a few cases of abrupt changes in policy preferences. Of the total 556 instances of significant change, 229 (41%) involved movement at a rate of more than 10 percentage points per year. This is not an enormous number out of the 1,128 repeated questions we examined, and especially not out of the much larger number of pairs of time points that we compared. (Many questions were repeated three or more times.) Still, the rapidity of change in some cases was quite striking, particularly for foreign policy issues. The mean rate of change for all our foreign policy instances of change was 31 percentage points per year, compared to 12 percentage points for domestic cases. (The medians were 12 and 4 percentage points, respectively.) That is, foreign policy changes were nearly three times as rapid, presumably because circumstances tend to change more quickly in international affairs. As Table 3 shows, 58% of changes in foreign policy matters and only 27% for domestic met our 10 percentage point criterion for abrupt change.
Among the foreign policy issues, war-related opinions changed more abruptly than others. Opinions on issues related to World War II and the Korean and Vietnam wars altered rapidly with wartime events. With the exceptions of Nixon-Watergate issues and certain economic matters, such as attitudes toward inflation and taxes, domestic opinion changes for the most part have been gradual. Still, one should not overstate the extent or the importance of abrupt changes in foreign policy opinions. To summarize the aggregate findings so far: Half the foreign policy preferences we examined showed no significant change at all, and of those opinions that changed, close to half shifted at a rate of less than 10 percentage points per year. Even the abrupt changes mostly involved small but very quick opinion shifts. This does not look like "violent movement" of public opinion.
To complete an appraisal of the alleged volatility of foreign policy opinions, however, we must also examine the question of opinion fluctuation, which bears upon assertions that opinion changes are temporary, transitory, or "moody."
We operationally defined a fluctuation in terms of the number of significant reversals in direction of opinion change within a given time interval, taking two or more significant changes in opposite directions within two years, or three or more within four years, as constituting a fluctuation. Fluctuations occurred infrequently-in only 31 (18%) of the 173 survey questions that were asked frequently enough to detect fluctuations. There was no significant difference between foreign versus domestic issues in this respect: 21% (19 of 89) foreign questions versus 14% (12 of 84) domestic questions involved fluctuations. This would not seem to support the notion that the public has fickle and vacillating moods toward either foreign or domestic affairs.
In fact, even the few fluctuations we found did not necessarily represent unpredictable or irrational shifts in policy preferences, or indeed any real preference changes at all. Some resulted from question wordings that embodied "shifting referents" and therefore changed meaning (despite identical wording) because of changing real-world conditions. Some questions, for example, referred to current government activity at the moment of the interview, which could be quite United States' position in the world. It is our judgment that the American public has generally responded in a sensible fashion to international and domestic events, as reported and interpreted by the U.S. mass media and by American leaders.
The following examples of important opinion changes, which include most of the large changes that have occurred, are based on questions that were repeated (with identical wording, unless otherwise noted) by the same survey organizations. Further information and documentation is available from the authors.
INTERNATIONALISM
The most fundamental issue of foreign policy arguably concerns how much foreign policy there will be, that is, how actively a nation will attempt to influence events in international affairs. It may have taken a quarter century before the majority of Americans affirmed Woodrow Wilson's position that the United States would have to take an active role in world affairs (see Levering, 1978; Foster, 1983; Klingberg, 1983; Holmes, 1985) , but they clearly did so in the 1940s. Figure 1 Here and in the remainder of this article, to support our argument that public opinion is rational and reasonable (given the information that citizens have available to them), we rely upon connections between particular opinion changes and the historical circumstances we briefly describe, not always spelling out the precise workings of Americans' beliefs and values. A fuller analysis is provided in Page and Shapiro (1987).5
WORLD WAR II
As Hitler began Germany's aggressive expansion in the middle and late 1930s, the U.S. government and American public opinion responded. Between September and November 1938, after the Munich 5. We can comment only in passing about relationships between public opinion and policymaking, a complicated topic that we continue to pursue. On the basis of our research so far, we believe that the relationship is reciprocal, but that public opinion probably more often affects policy than policy affects opinion (Page and Shapiro, 1983 ). In many cases in which the enactment of policies might be thought to have influenced public opinion, leaders or elites have in fact first "prepared" or influenced opinion, which then played a part in the making of policy. This account suggests that the public was moved both by objective circumstances and by opinion leadership. With respect to the latter, we should note at once that it is difficult to distinguish leadership or education of the public from manipulation or deception through misleading, incomplete, or inaccurate information. In the case of America's entry into the war, for example, Roosevelt's efforts at leadership may have been marred by his crafty maneuvering against Japan, his misrepresentation of incidents in the Atlantic, and his denial that American troops would be needed when he knew that they would be (see Beard, 1948) . Issues concerning education and manipulation of the public and the quality of the information it receives must be considered in any full assessment of democratic theory or practice. We deal with such issues elsewhere Shapiro, 1987, 1988 ) but allude to them only briefly below, because our chief concern here is with how the public reacts to the information (of whatever quality) that is made available to it.
Once Levering, 1976 Levering, , 1978 . Many became aware of the huge extent of Russian losses during the war and of Russia's efforts on the eastern front. Increasing proportions of the public expressed the opinion that Russia should not have to pay for Lend Lease aid. But the American public never fully trusted the Soviet Union or communism.
At the peak of wartime cooperation, much of the underlying antagonism toward the Russians was suspended. As many as 64% of Americans said that we could expect Russia "to cooperate" in working out problems together. As the end of the war neared, however, Americans' underlying fears and hostilities reemerged; the public's wartime optimism vanished, with the 64% dropping to 38% by late 1946 and presumably further by late 1947, when less than 20% thought we could count on Russia "to meet us halfway." Although the account of these trends in Caspary (1968; see also Gillroy, 1980) More Americans began to see the war as a "mistake" that the United States should have avoided. As had been the case with Korea, the number of "mistake" responses rose with the cumulative magnitude of U.S. casualties (Mueller, 1971 (Mueller, , 1973 , as well as with increasing dollar costs and disruptive demonstrations. Most members of the public disliked the demonstrators, but the demonstrators drew attention to the war, which the public also increasingly began to disfavor (see Burstein and Freudenberg, 1978) . President Johnson's popularity dropped calamitously, responding to the flow of bad news from Vietnam (Brody and Page, 1975) .
Not all opposition to the war took the form of favoring withdrawal; part of the public wanted to "win or get out" and was willing to use maximum force to gain victory. But the Tet offensive of early 1968 shocked the American public. While the military outcome was not the disaster that was portrayed in some news reports (see Braestrup, 1977 From the mid-1950s through more than two subsequent decades, however, the story of public preferences about U.S.-Chinese relations is one of slow, gradual increases in desires for rapprochement. There were temporary ups and downs: improvements with the Geneva conference of 1954 and Bandung nonalignment conference of 1955; setbacks with the Vietnam war and the Cultural Revolution; and acceleration with China's emergence as a nuclear power in October 1964. But long before Richard Nixon's "opening to China," the U.S. public had moved quite a way toward friendliness. Kusnitz (1984) thoroughly discusses these trends, which are included in the "China" entries in Table 3, The years 1980 and 1981 were in many respects the peak of the new Cold War. Carter's policies had already responded to the emerging sentiments with a substantial military buildup. The new Reagan administration added to the buildup, aimed hostile rhetoric at the Soviet "evil empire," and continued to stress the U.S.'s vulnerability, even after the lower estimates of Soviet military growth were widely known (Gervasi, 1986; Halloran and Gelb, 1983) . As the military budget grew, however, while the Federal Reserve kept money tight and the United States slid into recession, public enthusiasm for further armament began to fade. By spring 1982 public opinion had completely reversed its earlier movement, with only 31% favoring increased defense spending while 32% favored a decrease, and prospending opinion continued on a downward trend.
The rapid rise and fall of desires for defense spending was quite unusual, and meets our definition of an opinion fluctuation. But it did not much resemble the sort of capricious movement that Almond postulated; public opinion shifted in a predictable and reasonable way given international events and domestic circumstances and the information that citizens received. In part, the drop in preferences for defense spending reflected concern over domestic policy priorities, especially from 1982 to 1985; and in part it simply meant that people perceived the arms buildup as successful and sufficient. But the Reagan administration also appears to have produced a counterreaction among the public: alarm over the possibility of nuclear war. Large majorities-79% in April 1982, rising to 86% in November 1983-endorsed a "freeze" on the building, testing, and installation of nuclear weapons. Sentiment that the United States should "get tough" toward the Soviets dropped sharply, from 74% in January 1980 to 40% in May 1982. When the Reagan administration subsequently cooled its rhetoric, this was noted and welcomed by the public. The feeling that Reagan administration was "going too far" about plans to build more nuclear weapons in its reaction against the Soviets stood at 68% in July 1983, but dropped 21 percentage points, to 47%, in November.
CONCLUSION
It would be desirable to add to our account a description of recent trends in public opinion toward such important issues as strategic nuclear arms, international terrorism, Central America, and South Africa. Although we have not yet fully pieced together and analyzed all the survey data on these matters, we have so far found that they, too, tend to fit the pattern of public opinion responding reasonably to foreign and domestic events as political leaders, other elites, and the mass media report and interpret them.
We believe that the data in the first part of this article conclusively refute the notion that Americans' foreign policy preferences are volatile or fluctuate wildly. Collective opinion tends to be rather stable; it sometimes changes abruptly, but usually only by small amounts; and it rarely fluctuates. Moreover, our historical examination of opinion changes in the second part of the article should go a long way toward refuting any assertion that collective opinion moves in capricious or inexplicable ways. Virtually all changes in Americans' foreign policy preferences over the last half century are understandable in terms of changing circumstances or changing information. Moreover, we have found most of them to be reasonable, or sensible, in that they reflect in a logical fashion the impact of new information. We have left for elsewhere a more precise statement of this claim, but we feel justified in speaking of a "rational" public.
For present purposes we have been somewhat agnostic about questions of opinion manipulation or deception. Our other work (e.g., Page et al., 1987) has indicated that objective events do not often affect opinion in a direct or unmediated way; Americans get nearly all their information and interpretation about foreign affairs through the mass media, and the contents of the media-especially reports from experts and commentators-account for a high proportion of opinion changes. Any systematic misinformation or biases in the news, therefore, can have profound effects on public opinion, and we have suggested certain biases (e.g., nationalistic and anticommunist) that may in fact exist (Page and Shapiro, 1988) . For now, however, we focus on the more limited point that the public, given the information that is made available, does a good job of forming and changing its collective policy preferences.
Our conclusion, then, is very much in harmony with the views of V. 0. Key, Jr. (1961): The quality of public opinion tends to reflect the quality of the information and the choices with which the public is presented. If the public seems foolish or confused on some issue, the fault may very well lie with the providers of information-or misinformation. When leaders explain international realities clearly and correctly, the public generally responds sensibly, based on its underlying values. When information is unbiased, public opinion is very much worth taking into account in policymaking. There is no need to fear democracy.
